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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 
v. : 
APRIL GARZA, : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner appears to present several questions in her 
petition. However, in her argument she only contests the court 
of appeals' conclusion that she did not provide an adequate 
record on review because she did not provide a transcript of the 
hearing on her motion to suppress. A brief review of the 
appellate chronology of this case will demonstrate that the court 
of appeals ruled correctly. 
On August 3, 1990, petitioner timely filed a notice of 
appeal from her conviction of possession of equipment with intent 
to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8(l)(b) (1990), and one 
count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-201 and 58-
37-8 (1990) (R. 207).l On December 3, 1990, petitioner filed a 
1
 Petitioner apparently entered a conditional guilty plea to 
the two counts after the denial of her motion to suppress in 
accordance with State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
certification that a trial transcript was not needed on appeal 
(R. 222). On or about December 4, 1990, petitioner filed her 
opening brief. The State filed its brief on February 13, 1991. 
The court of appeals received a transcript of the suppression 
hearing on March 1, 1991, two weeks after the State's brief was 
due and filed (see letter attached hereto in the Addendum). 
Petitioner never sought to produce a transcript of her 
guilty plea hearing. She produced a transcript of the 
suppression hearing after both petitioner's and the State's 
briefs had been filed. Therefore, neither petitioner nor the 
State were able to use the hearing transcript in briefing this 
case. Petitioner's assertion that the transcript had been 
properly presented to the court of appeals misstates the facts of 
this case and should be rejected (Petition at 2; see petition's 
exhibit "C"). The court of appeals properly found that 
petitioner had not provided the transcript for the purposes of 
this appeal. State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah App. 1991). 
Therefore, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
denied. 
However, she did not produce a transcript of the guilty plea 
hearing, and the statement she signed prior to entering the plea 
did not fully comport with the conditional plea requirements of 
Serv. Therefore, the conditional plea could not be verified. The 
court of appeals noted that deficiency and reiterated the 
importance of providing a record to verify the entry of a 
conditional plea. State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 938-9 (Utah App. 
1991). 
2 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %{ day of March, 1992, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^HQM^ 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
distant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Dean N. Zabriski, attorney for petitioner, 3507 N. University 
Ave., Jamestown Square, Suite 370, Provo, Utah, 84604, this 3/ 
day of March, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 
Russell W Bench 
Presidine Judge 
Judith M. Billings 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Regnal W. Garff 
Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Judge 
Norman H. Jackson 
ludge 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
Leonard H. Russon 
iud
* Dean N. Zabriskie 
Attorney at Law 
3507 North University Avenue 
Jamestown Square, Suite 370 
Provo, Utah 84604 
In Re: 
Wtafj Court oA^tppeate, 
V»J& TW 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 ^ , > V G E ^ E ^ '** 
801-533-6800 i ^ f C R * ^ ^ 
March 4 , 1991 
,•,109**^ 
\°/\ 
^ r/^*', 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. Case No. 900562-CA 
April Garza, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Dear Mr. Zabriskie: 
This letter is to advise you that on March 1, 1991, a 
supplemental record (transcript) on the aboved named appeal 
was filed in this court. 
Sincerely, 
Sheri Knightdn 
Deputy Clerk 
cc: R. Paul Van Dam 
Judith S.H. Atherton 
APPENDIX 
STATE v. GARZA Utah 937 
Citea«820 PJd 937 (UtahApp. 199!) 
member or organ; and her bodily injury CONCLUSION 
did not create a substantial risk of death.
 h gum> w e a f f i m d e f e n d a n t ' s cormction 
Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1218-19. The court for aggravated burglary. We hold that 
affirmed his conviction, however, finding Mrs. Carly's courtroom behavior did not 
that the victim "suffered physical pain that deny defendant a fair trial. Furthermore, 
is precisely the type of 'physical injury' there is sufficient evidence that defendant 
contemplated by the statute." Peterson, caused "bodily injury" to uphold his convic-
681 P.2d at 1219. See also State v. Young, tion o f aggravated burglary under Utah 
559 P.2d 541, 542 (Utah 1977) (requisite Code A n n - § 76-6-203 (Supp.1988). 
physical injury present where defendant's 
blow to victim's face momentarily stunned GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
victim). concur. 
[3] Defendant attempts to distinguish 
Peterson and Young by contending that 
Mr. Carly sustained no bodily injury at all 
while he and Mr. Carly fought in the Carly 
home prior to the entrance of the other two 
assailants. The record does not support 
defendant's argument Mr. Carly testified 
that after defendant struck him in the 
mouth with a closed fist, knocking him off 
balance, he could taste blood inside his 
mouth. Defendant continued to attack Mr. 
Carly with his fists such that Mr. Carly 
was forced to restrain defendant in a head-
lock. Moreover, Deputy Reed Parkin of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, who 
investigated the disturbance at the Carly 
home, testified that Mr. Carly had sus-
tained significant "trauma" to his face. 
According to Parkin, Mr. Carly's lips were 
swollen, and there was a pinkish color 
around his teeth, making it evident that he 
had been bleeding.11 
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a 
reasonable jury could have found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that defendant caused 
"bodily injury" to Mr. Carly as contem-
plated by the statute. Therefore, we af-
firm defendant's conviction for aggravated 
burglary. 
15. Defendant contends that even if Mr. Carly's 
dizziness is a statutorily-recognized "bodily inju-
ry," he is not liable because another assailant 
caused the dizziness by pushing Mr. Carly 
against the kitchen sink. This argument is with-
out merit. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (Supp. 
1988) clearly provides that the injury may be 
perpetrated by "the actor or another participant 
in the crime." Id Furthermore, Utah Code 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
f. 
April GARZA, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 900562-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 7, 1991. 
Defendant entered plea after the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., denied her motion to 
suppress certain evidence. Defendant ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that Court would not review issue of 
propriety of denial of motion to suppress 
where defendant did not take issue with 
trial court's findings of fact and failed to 
provide transcript of hearing on motion to 
suppress. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) states: "Every person, 
acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits 
the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which constitutes an of-
fense shall be criminally liable as a part> for 
such conduct." 
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1. Criminal Law <*=>1144.12 
Court of Appeals was to assume cor-
rectness of denial of motion to suppress 
where defendant did not take issue with 
trial court's findings of fact and failed to 
provide court with transcript of hearing; 
failure to provide transcript made it impos-
sible to even verify that conditional plea, 
that would allow appeal, was even properly 
entered. 
2. Criminal Law **1026.1<K5) 
Court of Appeals reviews rulings on 
preplea motions to suppress only when 
such plea, entered with consent of prosecu-
tion and accepted by trial judge, specifical-
ly preserves suppression issue for appeal, 
and Court of Appeals allows withdrawal of 
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of 
suppression are accepted. 
3. Criminal Law e»U19(2), 1130(3, 5) 
Court of Appeal's decision not to con-
sider merits of defendant's issues on appeal 
for failure to provide transcript of suppres-
sion hearing was bolstered by defendant's 
failure to include statement of facts in 
brief, as required by appellate rul^s, or to 
include citations to record in brief, which 
were grounds to refuse to reach issues. 
Rules App.Proc., Rule 24(aX7). 
Dean N. Zabriskie, Provo, for defendant 
and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. Ather-
ton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appel-
lee. 
Before JACKSON, ORME and RUSSON, 
JJ. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant April Garza appeals from the 
trial court's denial of her motion to sup-
press certain evidence. We affirm. 
Defendant asserts in conclusory terms 
that both the warrantless search of her 
vehicle and the warrant search of her resi-
dence violated her constitutional rights to 
be free from illegal searches and seizures. 
[1] Defendant has not taken issue with 
the trial court's findings of fact and has 
failed to provide this court with a tran-
script of the hearing on the motion to sup-
press, therefore, we must assume, as a 
matter of law, that the trial court's decision 
to deny that motion, was not erroneous. 
See Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 
(Utah 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 
110 S.Ct 751,107 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990) (court 
assumes regularity of proceedings below 
where appellant faQs to provide adequate 
record on appeal) (citing State v. Miller, 
718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Bobbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 
1982)). See also State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 
252, 253 (Utah 1983) (court assumes cor-
rectness of judgment below if counsel on 
appeal fails to cite to record); State v. 
Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982) 
(court assumes correctness of findings 
when defendant's brief contained nothing 
more than defendant's version of facts 
found by trial court). 
[2] While this may seem like a harsh 
result, we cannot, review the proceedings 
below without an adequate record. Defen-
dant's failure to provide us with a tran-
script makes it impossible for us, for exam-
ple, even to verify that a conditional plea 
was properly entered, as defendant con-
tends. In State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah App.1988), this court acknowledged 
that the use of conditional guilty pleas by 
criminal defendants was a sound and sensi-
ble practice, "if agreed to by the prosecu-
tion and accepted by the trial court" Id, 
at 938 (emphasis added). We review rul-
ings on pre-plea motions to suppress only 
when such a plea "entered by the defen-
dant with the consent of the prosecution 
and accepted by the trial judge specifically 
preserves the suppression issue for appeal 
and allows withdrawal of the plea if defen-
dant's arguments in favor of suppression 
are accepted by the appellate court[.]" Id. 
In State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 
1990), this court stated that "[a] defendant 
seeking appellate review pursuant to a con-
ditional plea bears the burden of demon-
strating that the conditional nature of the 
plea is unambiguously established in the 
STATE v. 
Cite as 820 M d 937 
trial court record." Id. at 1271 (citations 
omitted). 
[3] In this case, because defendant has 
pot supplied us with the requisite record, 
ire do not review the denial of her motion 
lo suppress. Our decision not to consider 
the merits of defendant's issues on appeal 
g further bolstered by the fact that she 
failed to include a statement of facts in her 
brief, as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Nei-
ther does defendant's brief contain any ci-
tations to the record. In Demetropoulos v. 
Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App.) 
(Jackson, J., concurring), cert denied, 765 
p.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), the author of this 
opinion commented that "[t]he time will 
most assuredly arrive when a panel of this 
court will be constrained to disregard intol-
erable and unacceptable briefs and not 
reach the merits of the case/' Id In 
English v. Standard Optical, 814 P.2d 
613, 618-19 (Utah App,1991), we overcame 
any trepidation that may have been present 
about declining to rea£h an issue and made 
clear that when an appellant's argument 
contains no citations to the record and no 
legal authority, and as such does not com-
ply with briefing rules, we would decline to 
reach those issues.1 
The trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress is affirmed. 
RUSSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
I concur in the court's opinion. I write 
separately because this is a criminal case, 
and I believe in such cases we should be 
somewhat less fastidious in insisting upon 
compliance with technical requirements as 
a condition to reaching the merits. I would 
not be comfortable denying a criminal de-
fendant any meaningful exercise of her 
constitutional right to an appeal merely 
because of superficial deficiencies in the 
brief prepared by her attorney. 
1. See also Utah R.App P 24(a)(9) ('The argu-
ment shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, with citations to the authorities, stat 
ues, and parts of the record relied on "), State v. 
GARZA Utah 939 
(Utah App 1991) 
That point having been made, I hasten to 
add this is not such an instance I found it 
impossible to glean from her brief what 
appellant's basic contentions are on appeal. 
Insofar as it is true that her complaint is 
about the legality of certain searches, 
where she takes no issue with the court's 
findings (something she could not, as a 
practical matter, do without a transcript) 
there is little we can do. If the findings 
were inadequate, we would remand for ade-
quate findings. See, e.g., State v. Love-
gren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App.1990). 
If the findings supported only a legal con-
clusion that the searches, or one of them, 
was illegal, we would reverse. See, e.g., 
State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341 (Utah App. 
1991). Neither scenario seems present 
here and nothing in appellant's brief serves 
to convince me otherwise. 
One other point merits comment The 
problems attending an inadequate brief can 
sometimes be ameliorated with a helpful 
presentation at oral argument See, e.g., 
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 
962 n. 6 (Utah App.1988), cert denied, 
Rone v. Demetropoulos, 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988). In this case, under circum-
stances which inspire little confidence, we 
had the benefit of oral argument only by 
counsel for the State. As counsel's cavali-
er attitude concerning this court's calendar-
ing requirements is not unique, I want to 
take the occasion to point up the argument 
protocol the judges of this court expect. 
The protocol is premised on the notion that 
appellate argument is a rather significant 
event in the life of an attorney. 
Upon receipt of notice of argument, 
counsel should immediately check his or 
her calendar. Existing conflicts should or-
dinarily give way to the scheduled argu-
ment Attendance at the Court of Appeals 
is a sufficient excuse for changing most 
depositions and meetings. A narrow range 
of existing conflicts may warrant a change 
of time for the appellate argument as 
scheduled, at least if a partner or associate 
can not capably make the argument A 
Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1352 (Utah App 1991); 
Chnstensen v Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Utah 
App 1991), Koults v Standard Oil Co of Cat, 
746 P2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App 1987) 
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first place trial setting in a case that will 
not be settled, a long-planned vacation 
where non-refundable arrangements have 
been made, and scheduled medical or surgi-
cal procedures may be examples. How-
ever, to minimize disruption for opposing 
counsel as well as the court, a motion re-
questing a continuance and setting forth 
the problem in some detail should be filed 
within a few days of receipt of the notice— 
not within a few days prior to argument 
Once argument has been set, one simply 
does not permit inconsistent obligations to 
come into existence thereafter. There are 
few reasons for avoiding the setting of 
depositions, trials, or hearings better than 
"I am scheduled at the Court of Appeals 
that morning." 
Unless a well-supported motion to contin-
ue has been filed within a few days of 
receipt of our notice of argument, or argu-
ment is formally waived, we simply expect 
counsel to appear as scheduled unless an 
actual emergency, not reasonably to have 
been anticipated, arises and is brought to 
our attention as promptly as possible. If 
argument has not been previously waived 
as a matter of informed judgment, we as-
sume the case merits argument, in which 
event it is simply unprofessional to just be 
a "no-show" even if a legitimate emergen-
cy has arisen. 
5> 
